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Research
Voluntary Participation in Regional Fisheries Management Council
Meetings
Danielle T. Brzezinski 1, James Wilson 1, and Yong Chen 1
ABSTRACT. Insufficient and unrepresentative participation in voluntary public hearings and policy
discussions has been problematic since Aristotle’s time. In fisheries, research has shown that involvement
is dominated by financially resourceful and extreme-opinion stakeholders and tends to advantage groups
that have a lower cost of attendance. Stakeholders may exhibit only one or all of these traits but can be still
similarly advantaged. The opposites of these traits tend to characterize the disadvantaged, such as the
middle-ground opinions, the less wealthy or organized, and the more remote stakeholders. Remoteness or
distance is the most straightforward and objective of these characteristics to measure. We analyzed the
New England Fishery Management Council’s sign-in sheets for 2003–2006, estimating participants’ travel
distance and associations with the groundfish, scallop, and herring industries. We also evaluated the
representativeness of participation by comparing attendance to landings and permit distributions. The
distance analysis showed a significant correlation between attendance levels and costs via travel distance.
These results suggest a potential bias toward those stakeholders residing closer to meeting locations, possibly
disadvantaging parties who are further and must incur higher costs. However, few significant differences
were found between the actual fishing industry and attendee distributions, suggesting that the geographical
distribution of the meeting attendees is statistically similar to that of the larger fishery. The interpretation
of these results must take into consideration the limited time span of the analysis, as policy changes may
have altered the industry make-up and location prior to our study. Furthermore, the limited geographical
input of stakeholders may lend bias to the Council’s perception of ecological and social conditions
throughout the spatial range of the fishery. These factors should be further considered in the policy-formation
process in order to incorporate a broader range of stakeholder input.
Key Words: fisheries policy; New England; voluntary participation
INTRODUCTION
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (1976) established eight regional
fishery management councils to oversee and
regulate the United States’ fisheries from 3–200
nautical miles. These councils in turn create
committees that advise the Council during
formation of Fishery Management Plans (FMPs).
In this development process, participation of the
public and stakeholders is not only encouraged, but
legally mandated by the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) requirements, which enable
development of multiple policy options to address
stakeholders’ concerns and to identify the option
that is most suitable for achieving fishery
management goals (Fishery Conservation 2005).
Public participation is a legal requirement
(Magnuson-Stevens 1976) and also considered a
necessity for successful adaptive management in
order to respond to and reflect the fishery (McCool
and Guthrie 2001).
Olson (1965) suggests that as the personal stake of
members in a particular group, like an industry,
increases, the selective incentives of these members
to affect the regulatory outcomes, perhaps through
organization, also increase. Additionally, the
benefits from affecting regulatory outcomes tend to
increase. This type of organization is expensive,
thus only those with high stakes in the policy
outcome and likely to derive a net benefit participate
1University of Maine
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(Noll 1999). These benefits can mitigate to some
extent the free-rider problem that is present in
voluntary participation, where private costs work
against action for the public good (Olson 1965).
Participation carries the primary benefit of having
a role in the decision-making process, whether
through a direct vote or influence on those who vote,
with anticipation of a larger profit or share during
the allocation process (Bulkley et al. 2001).
We feel, however, that the makeup of the voluntary
participant pool has not been fully considered in the
development of the participation requirement, as
studies regarding participation argue that the
wealthy, the geographically local, the small, and the
strong-opinioned are more likely to attend and
participate (Osborne et al. 2000). Specifically,
Turner and Weninger (2005) observed that
voluntary participants were more often groups with
extreme, rather than moderate, positions. The
regulated industry, the greatest component of those
strong-opinion participants, is most likely to
become well organized to influence regulation so
as to obtain more advantageous regulation (Noll
1999). Through the feedback loop of regulation
decisions and influence comes the possibility of
regulatory capture by the industry, a desired goal
and motivation for participation (Stigler 1971). This
outcome has been noted within the regional councils
(Merrell Katsouros 2003). An independent review
stated that many of the council members have “an
economic interest in the outcome of their votes” or
at the very least have strong ties to the industry
(Merrell Katsouros 2003). In this situation, these
connections lead to an elevated level of influence
by the industry.
Osborne et al. (2000) along with others have
developed models to predict outcomes and
involvement in such situations. Three features tend
to be standard: nonparticipation of moderates,
overall low participation, and the outcome’s
dependency on the attendee makeup. As noted by
Turner and Weninger (2005) in their study of the
mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery,
the opinions most often shared at public comment
meetings are those of groups with extreme views.
Travel to and from and time spent at these meetings
is not reimbursed. These costs are borne
individually by the participants, decreasing overall
attendance and concentrating only those with the
means or the incentives to attend. This
conglomeration of the extremes produces a highly
polarized setting for policy making. Participation
by either extreme can flipflop a policy over separate
meetings (Allen 1991, New England Fishery
Management Council 1985). These observed and
modeled features of participants can stem from the
costs of participating (Osborne et al. 2000).
Benefits and costs to individuals or groups depend
on travel costs, perceived possible influence on the
outcome, and personal stake in the matter at hand.
Osborne et al. (2000) pointed out that participation
by individual fishermen and representative fishing
groups are prime examples of costly participation
having a significant effect on involvement and
subsequent regulation. They noted that these
individuals often travel long distances to participate
in these meetings, incurring travel costs and
possibly lost profits from choosing not to fish. They
also indicated that regulation depends in part on the
positions taken by attendees at these meetings.
Becker (1983, 1985) found that regulators
responded to pressure from various modeled
pressure groups in terms of subsidies received and
taxes paid due to public policy. They found that
these groups competed to influence policy
outcomes. Although these groups had no actual
vote, whether as members of the public or as
legislators, the pressure generated influenced the
outcome of policy. Thus, regulation in these
instances favored groups better able to apply
pressure. For fishermen, one source of pressure
involves meeting participation, whether personally
or through representatives.
Previous studies have looked at the possible
components and motivations for participation,
although the literature has rarely focused directly
on regional fisheries management. Further
incentive to address this aspect of fisheries
management lies in the potential ecological effects.
In a heterogeneous fishery that spans a wide range
of space and habitat and physical and biological
conditions, a more homogeneous, localized
stakeholder input may potentially bias the policy
process. Thus, these concerns extend beyond the
social and economic impacts of policy to the
ecological interactions with the resource.
The objective of this study is to evaluate the
potential bias in stakeholder participation that arises
due to the costs of participating in fisheries
management meetings. We want to (1) analyze
attendance records for correlations between costs
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(measured as distance traveled) of attending and
rates of attending; (2) analyze meeting records to
determine whether voluntary, non-voting participants
have influence on voted policies; and (3) evaluate
whether the levels of participation are representative
of the larger industry.
METHODS
Study site
This study examines participation in the New
England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC),
which regulates the marine fisheries in the federal
waters off the New England coast. The Council
meets generally five to nine times a year throughout
the New England area. The NEFMC was chosen for
this study because of recently expressed concerns
from remotely located fishermen regarding the
distance to such meetings and their continued
inability to contribute input to regulations (J.
Wilson, University of Maine - Orono, personal
communication). Furthermore, the NEFMC had
been the recipient of intense scrutiny because of the
highly publicizied court case, “Conservation Law
Foundation v Evans” (2001), in which the
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) sued, alleging
that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
failed to prevent overfishing and minimize bycatch,
thus violating the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act.
This recent case, among others, emphasized the
issues that the regional councils had with
implementing the new mandates. The prominence
of these cases brought increased criticism to the
NEFMC and highlighted the contentious
management setting.
The focus fisheries
The NEFMC manages nine fishery management
plans (FMPs), encompassing a total of 28 species.
This research focuses on three fisheries: the
multispecies (groundfish), the Atlantic herring, and
the Atlantic sea scallop fisheries. The scallop
industry was the most valuable industry in New
England and the mid-Atlantic in 2000 and continues
to rise (Ocean Studies Board 2002). Its continued
success has been attributed to the closed areas and
its rotating management system, implemented by
the NEFMC (Hart and Rago 2006). The groundfish
fishery had a recent amendment to its FMP in 2003
that was a direct result of the CLF v Evans (2001)
decision. Finally, the herring fishery was identified
because of its importance as bait in the $400 million-
a-year lobster industry (NMFS 2007). These three
fisheries are of particular importance to the New
England area. They have been the main sources of
income for fishers, as well as sources of conflict
over policy decisions. Due to their regional
importance, they were deemed good selections for
a more focused interest study.
Participation
Public participation at the NEFMC meetings is
recorded on sign-in sheets, which are available at
every meeting. Individuals attending are encouraged
to fill out whatever identifying information they
wish, ranging from a simple self-description of
status (e.g., recreational fisherman) to a full address
and identification of their affiliation. These sign-in
sheets are a convenient method for assessing an
individual’s travel costs to the meeting, using
distance as a proxy, and fishery affiliations.
We gathered the sign-in sheets for the general
NEFMC council meetings for the years 2003 to
2006. There were a total of 26 meetings, covering
68 days. We categorized these data according to
meeting date and location, and hailing location of
the participant. The hailing location of each
participant was determined using the sign-in
information, personal contacts, and the internet
search engine Google®. The US Census provided
the county subdivision levels for organizing the
locations. We used ArcGIS® 9.2 (Environmental
Systems Research Institute (ESRI) 2007) to project
the data points and calculate the as-the-crow-flies-
distance from each hailing point to the meeting
location point. ArcGIS also calculated the meeting
locations’ mean center.
To the extent possible, we identified each
participant’s affiliations with the herring, scallop,
or groundfish fisheries using associated data such
as fishing permits, cooperative affiliations, and
employment. Each identified individual was
assigned to one of the three target fisheries. For
some individuals, this affiliation changed for
different meetings and was adjusted to reflect the
signed-in affiliation. An average percentage of
industry participation per meeting date provided a
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Fig. 1. Mean center for 2003–2006 NEFMC meetings.
baseline level of participation using only those
meeting dates that reported 20 or more attendees to
prevent sparsely attended meeting dates from
skewing the results. This process excluded 16
meeting dates out of 70 (23%). We defined meeting
dates with abnormally high attendance as those that
had a participation level greater than 1.5 standard
deviations away from the average attendance level.
For these meeting dates, we collected and reviewed
the posted agendas, motion minutes, and meeting
minutes for particular policy implications and/or
stakeholder involvement (accessed at http://www.n
efmc.org). We used all meeting dates and their
attendees for the distance analysis, as this analysis
focused on overall participation.
Industry representation
To evaluate whether the observed participation was
representative of the larger industry, we collected
landings and permit data for the same time period.
Using the methods of Syrjala (1996), we compared
the spatial distributions of each of these data sets,
attendees, landings, and permits, against the others
to determine any significant (α = 0.05 and 0.01)
differences. The method uses the ordered
calculation of distances of standardized locations to
arbitrary origins and compares these differences
between the two data sets. To evaluate potential
differences in the geographic area considered, we
used three different regions: New England (Maine
to Connecticut); New England down to the
Washington, D.C. latitude; and New England and
the coastal mid-Atlantic (Maine to North Carolina).
RESULTS
NEFMC meetings
The mean center for the meeting locations from
2003 to 2006 was located in the county subdivision
of Lynn, Massachusetts, in northeastern Massachusetts
(Fig. 1). A linear regression of the natural log of the
number of attendants and distance traveled was
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Fig. 2. Linear regression of the frequency of attendee distances traveled (p < 0.001).
significant (R2 = 0.80, p < 1x10-8, Fig. 2). An
analysis of variance indicated a significant
difference among the travel distances of the three
fisheries, groundfish, scallop, and herring (p <
0.001). After the Bonferroni correction, this
significant difference remained between the
individual fisheries (p < 0.001). Histograms of
distance traveled by the separate fisheries highlight
the different distance distributions (Figs. 3–5).
The focus fisheries
A total of 12 meetings showed attendance levels
higher than 1.5 standard deviations. When
correlated back to the meeting agendas and minutes,
all of the significant meeting dates corresponded to
finalization of new regulations and fishery
specifications, along with planning for upcoming
regulations. We present one significant meeting
date from each of the focus fisheries (Table 1) and
use these three cases as examples of the broader
pattern seen of participants’ involvement.
On 12 May 2004, the high number of groundfish
industry members that attended the Council meeting
in Providence, Rhode Island, led to an industry
member request, as recorded in the minutes, that the
meeting location be moved to allow the many
individuals standing in the hallway to enter the
room. The Council denied the request in the interest
of time but did grant industry leaders time to speak
to the Council regarding Framework Adjustment
40A.
Framework Adjustment 40A defined the new
Category B-Days-At-Sea (DAS) program that had
originally been a part of Amendment 13, voted in
2003, but had yet to be fully developed. The B-DAS
program days represented part of the compromise
for reducing fishing days. This program was
originally part of an industry proposal, as noted in
the meeting minutes, and represented opportunities
to regain lost income. Participants influenced the
terms of the program, offering solutions to resolving
issues regarding access, bycatch levels, and allotted
DAS. Specifically, a suggestion from an industry
representative to change the allocation of the B-
DAS over time was incorporated and passed.
An important meeting date for the herring fishery
was 28 September 2006, when the 2007–2009
fishery specifications were set. The meeting
minutes indicated a divide within the room, mainly
between herring fishers on one side and
conservation groups and tuna fishers on the other
side. The sticking point regarded the allocation of
quota between the inshore and offshore areas.
Herring fishers advocated for maintaining the
higher quotas in the inshore area, whereas
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Fig. 3. Distribution of groundfish attendee distances.
conservation groups and tuna fishers (who depend
on herring schools to attract tuna) advocated for
reduced quotas inshore. The debate lasted for nearly
2 h until an industry representative and member of
the Herring Advisory Panel offered a compromise,
saying that the Panel had supported a higher quota
but would support a compromised decrease. A
Council member incorporated this compromise into
an amendment, which carried unanimously and with
many members agreeing that this compromise was
the best overall option.
Finally, the 24 February 2004 meeting held the final
approval of and amendments to Framework 16/39,
a joint framework to bring the scallop industry
closures and bycatch quotas in line with the
groundfish FMP. The industry’s comments were
instrumental in adjusting the cod bycatch limit in
special access areas. Industry members acknowledged
the dire state of the cod fishery and the need for
caution when setting bycatch limits. However, the
proposed zero-catch, they said, would risk a permit
on the basis of one fish. They also argued that the
cod are not targeted, but any that were caught would
be regulatory discards under this plan and assumed
dead. Stakeholders lobbied for retaining a small
amount of cod bycatch for personal use. These
arguments convinced the Council to incorporate this
rule within the regulations, allowing the bycatch to
be kept for personal use without compromising the
vessel’s permit. Furthermore, the Council
incorporated the industry’s recommendations for
contingency measures should the regulations’
implementation be delayed. These alterations
reflected the Council’s integration of the industry’s
input into regulations.
Industry representation
Overall the distributions of the landings and permits
were non-significant from each other and the
attendee distributions for all three fisheries. The
only difference significant at the 95% confidence
level was between permits and landings for the
Washington, D.C. geographic distribution for the
scallop industry (Fig. 6). Scallop attendee and
landings distributions showed significant differences
at the 90% confidence level for both the
Washington, D.C. and North Carolina geographic
extents. The permits and attendee distributions
showed a significant difference at the 90%
confidence level for the North Carolina geographic
extent. No other significant differences were
present.
Ecology and Society 15(3): 2
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art2/
Fig. 4. Distribution of herring attendee distances.
DISCUSSION
This study evaluated participation levels at the
NEFMC general council meetings from 2003 to
2006. It assessed potential differences in
representation between the focus fisheries and the
observed representation. The data from this study
support the previously shown trend that attendees
who are geographically closer to meetings have a
higher level of attendance (Osborne et al. 2000).
The linear regression of distance traveled vs.
attendee origin showed a highly significant and
inverse relationship, supporting the geographic
trend observed by Osborne et al. (2000) and Turner
and Weninger (2005). The proximity of the meeting
place to the major industry fishing ports could help
explain some of the very high levels of attendance
of nearby attendees. New Bedford, Massachusetts,
which is less than 100 km away from the mean center
of Lynn, Massachusetts, is one of the largest scallop
ports in both the mid-Atlantic and the Northeast
(Ocean Studies Board 2002). Many groundfishers
are located around the port of New Bedford and also
Gloucester, Massachusetts, which is within 50 km
of Lynn. A large portion of herring fishers are also
located around Gloucester, with the second largest
port at Portland, Maine. These main locations of
participants can help to explain the high attendance
levels of nearby attendees but do not explain the
significantly different distributions of the attendee
distances for the three fisheries.
The financial success of the respective industries
may help to explain the further-distant attendees
(Osborne et al. 2000). The scallop industry is by far
the most profitable of the three industries, having
an ex-vessel value in 2006 of over $325 million
(NMFS 2007). Over the study period, this industry,
through the Fisheries Survival Fund that represents
most of the limited-access scallop vessels (D. Frulla
and S. Gehan, personal communication, 13 August
2004), hired three different law firms to represent
its interests at the NEFMC meetings. These law
firms are located around Washington, D.C.,
accounting for the attendees coming from 700–800
km. The herring industry, the next most profitable
with a 2006 catch worth just under $240 million
(NMFS 2007), similarly hired these same law firms,
although not as consistently, and thus the numbers
of distant attendees in this range are slightly lower.
Finally, the groundfish industry has been the least
profitable, having a 2006 catch worth under $115
million (NMFS 2007). Most of the attendees for this
industry came from within 150 km, with the levels
of attendance dropping off beyond 225 km. These
travel distances may reflect not only the location of
the fleet, as seen in the nearby attendees, but also
the monetary aspects, as farther travel distances
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Fig. 5. Distribution of scallop attendee distances.
incur higher costs. Consistently further travel
distances were more prevalent in the more profitable
industries (scallop and herring). From the relative
percentages of distances traveled by fishery
attendees (Fig. 7), it is clear that nearby participants
dominate the groundfish industry’s attendance,
possibly due to the factors listed above. Ground
fishermen from along the Maine coast have voiced
concerns regarding the costs of traveling to these
distant meetings (J. Wilson, personal communication,
15 September 2006), reflecting this observed
discrepancy in attendee travel distances.
Attempts have been made by the NEFMC to
encourage and further increase participation by
attendees. The following statement, written in
boldfaced text, was distributed as part of the meeting
agenda for the 15 April 2003 meeting:
Fishermen and members of the public are
strongly encouraged to closely track the
development of Amendment 13 to the
Groundfish FMP. It will be especially
important to attend Groundfish Committee
meetings, as well as Council meetings,
between now and July. The range of
alternatives available for consideration in
the amendment will be finalized during this
period. 
These agendas are posted at least 2 wk before the
meeting. Even with such an insistent message, the
attendance for this meeting showed only slightly
higher attendance levels, as defined in this study.
The meeting, held in Danvers, Massachusetts, was
less than 32 km from the mean center of Lynn,
Massachusetts and was likely not a factor in the
attendance level. Although meetings during the
planning process of regulation may be less attended,
due to multiple logistical reasons, the industries
tended to respond to final decision council meetings.
Most of the smeeting dates with significant
attendance corresponded to some sort of final policy
decision for that corresponding industry, reflecting
Noll (1999) and Olson’s (1965) observations that
those groups most influenced by policy decisions
are likely to participate. In these instances, those
groups who would be affected by the decisive policy
attended and lent their presence to the meeting’s
atmosphere. In each of our three examples, industry
involvement specifically translated into decisions
on policy that reflected the influence of their
presence, as noted in the meeting minutes. In
addition to these three dates, the meeting minutes
for all meeting dates with significant attendance
included comments from the Council members that
indicated that the presence and arguments of the
voluntary attendees persuaded their views and,
more importantly, their votes on policy. These
meeting minutes provide a key resource that
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Table 1. Examples of highly attended meetings. One meeting is listed for each focus fishery. Level of
participation indicates the percentage of the industry’s attendees compared with the total attendees present
at the meeting.
Meeting Date Interest Fishery Level of Participation (%) Policy action
24-Feb-04 Scallop 26.7 Joint Framework 16/39 for Scallop and
Multispecies Fishery Management Plans,
bringing closure areas in Scallop FMP in line
with closures of Multispecies FMP
12-May-04 Groundfish 68.1 Finalization of Framework Adjustment 40A to
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan: B
Days-at-Sea implementation
28-Sep-06 Herring 39.1 Finalization of 2007–2009 specifications for
herring allocations between inshore and
offshore areas
attendance influences policy outcomes, supporting
the previous observations that non-voting attendees
can affect voted decisions (Bulkley et al. 2001).
The landings and permit data incorporate the larger
industry, which the sign-in sheets cannot. Within
the Washington, D.C. geographic extent, the
comparison between permits and landings showed
a significant difference in distribution that
disappeared within both the larger and smaller
geographic extents. This difference was likely due
to the wider dispersal of permits in this area and
along the New Jersey coast, with a large majority
of the landings occurring only in Cape May and
Barnegat Light, New Jersey, and New Bedford,
Connecticut. This difference evened out once the
Virginia and North Carolina permit holders and
landings were included, displaying a more similar
distribution. The high presence and influence of the
scallop industry’s legal counsel from Washington,
D.C. were highlighted by this study, but these
individuals could not be represented in either the
landings or permit data. Although landings and
permits would not capture these legal attendees, the
design of the study highlights such discrepancies
for further analysis, in this case indicating the legal
presence.
The extreme drop-off of attendees from south of
Washington, D.C. likely led to the differences seen
between attendee and permit lists, and attendee and
landings distributions for the North Carolina
geographical extent, although this difference was
only significant at the 90% confidence level. The
difference between the landings and attendee
distribution was more geographically prevalent, as
this difference arose at the 90% confidence level
within the Washington, D.C. geographic extent as
well. This difference most likely reflected the
landings that were present from Massachusetts
down to North Carolina with far fewer attendee-
hailing points south of New England. Although the
landings may have been more spread along the
coasts than either the attendees or the permits,
especially towards the mid-Atlantic region, the
concentration of attendees, permits, and landings in
New Bedford, Connecticut shaped these data sets
and their similarities.
CONCLUSION
This study looked specifically at distance to the
meeting location as a proxy for travel costs, along
with interest of the attendees and possible effects
on policy decisions and the representativeness of
the attendance. Our results concurred with those
projected in models in the literature (Turner and
Weninger 2005) and suggested a possible
association between travel distance (as a proxy for
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Fig. 6. Distributions of randomization for comparison of scallop distributions of permits and landings
for the Washington, D.C. region. Solid line: Psi statistic; Dotted lines: 90% CI; Dashed lines: 95% CI.
costs) and the likelihood of participation. The results
from the interest analysis indicated that presence
can be influential as well, seen through the
incorporation of attendees’ comments and views
into the Council discussion and, sometimes,
regulations. These results coincided with the
research by Becker (1983, 1985) and Osborne et al.
(2000) that suggested that fishermen and
representative groups can be highly susceptible to
the costs of voluntary participation. Finally, the
distribution data highlighted some key representatives
within the scallop industry, although on the whole
indicating that the attendees present are not
significantly different from the larger industry
distribution.
Coupling these results with our distance analysis
and representation analysis provides two potentially
conflicting views. The distance analysis indicated
that the participant make-up favors those
individuals closer to the meeting location, possibly
due to the travel costs incurred. However, the
representation analysis indicated that overall few
significant differences existed among the attendees
and the industry’s distribution, both in terms of
permitted vessels and actual landings.
These results potentially reflect the centralization
of the fisheries. This centralization can be due to
more optimal habitats in certain areas, creating
more-distant minorities in the fisheries. Additionally,
this centralization can be from previous policy
changes and influence that occurred before the
beginning of our study. Our analysis occurred after
earlier significant legislation that likely contributed
to the fisheries’ current distributions, possibly
favoring those individuals within this geographic
extent. Thus, our distance analysis would reveal a
statistically significant relationship between
attendee frequency and distance traveled while
lacking any significant spatial differences in
industry distribution from meeting attendance.
Considering the prior regulatory history in the
previous decade, this explanatory theory is possible.
The scallop fleet gained a limited-access control in
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Fig. 7. Industry attendee distances for groundfish, scallop, and herring industries. Data pooled to show
the varying amounts across the distances.
1994. At the same time, the groundfish closures on
Georges Bank were implemented. These closures
prohibited access to the scallop fleet to some of the
most profitable grounds. The limited-access scallop
industry regained access to these areas in 1999 and
has become the most profitable industry in both the
Northeast and mid-Atlantic (NMFS 2007). Edwards
(2002) argued that this access came as a result of
the scallop industry’s voluntary participation and
lobbying at council meetings. This potential success
could have resulted in a positive feedback of
attendance, influence, and results. In 2000, the
herring FMP was developed to manage what was
considered an under-utilized resource (NEFMC
1999). The study began in 2003 when Amendment
13 to the groundfish FMP, which restructured the
permits and fishing rights, was passed. At the
beginning of the study period, only those individuals
with A-DAS could legally fish. The formation of
the B-DAS programs (FA40A) occurred within the
study period and provided a good example of
increased participation and industry involvement
(Table 1). However, these previous regulations may
have shaped the fishery into a very different
appearance than in the mid-1990s, not considering
the initial federal fisheries management implementation
in the 1970s. These events can only be alluded to,
in terms of their effects on this research, as the same
analyses have not been applied to those periods.
The emphasis of the Magnuson-Stevens Act on
public participation has established the requirement
for seeking public comment; however, the location
of meetings and the lack of other options for
involvement, such as teleconferencing, move the
make-up of the participant pool toward individuals
geographically closer or more financially able to
attend. There has been a recent push to such options
as phone- and teleconferencing within the NEFMC,
but only for committee meetings currently. The
North Pacific Fishery Management Council
(NPFMC), which regulates federal waters off the
shores of Alaska and incorporates Washington
interests, has regularly used teleconferencing for
both general council and committee meetings,
providing local sites for the public (Department of
Commerce, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration, and North Pacific Fishery
Management Council 2008, 2009). The increased
use of such remote methods of participation,
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http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art2/
involving local community and academic sources
of technology, could facilitate the involvement of
more distant and less financially able groups.
These geographical biases are potentially magnified
by the ecological distribution of the resource. The
presence of a homogeneous resource would not
involve any geographical issues in participation, as
stakeholders would receive similar benefits and
disadvantages of policy throughout the management’s
range. However, if stocks are not randomly
distributed but rather portray a more metapopulation-
like distribution, the lack of a broader range of
stakeholder input coupled with the homogeneous
management practices can have a much different
outcome. The question becomes what are the
outcomes should either assumption, homogeneous
or clustered, be wrong. If indeed there is a single
stock but management mistakenly assumes a
metapopulation with local structure, extra time and
effort would have been unnecessarily spent to
include a broader range of input. Although the time
spent may have been unnecessary from a biological
viewpoint, the extra effort could be beneficial from
a social standpoint. If the population stocks are
clustered in a metapopulation structure but are
assumed to be a single undifferentiated population,
policies implemented for the larger region without
considering a broader range of input may negatively
impact the existence of local sub-populations
(Wilson 2006). Geographically biased input on
regulations that affect a larger, heterogeneous stock
may not have the assumed homogeneous results
across the region. Work on Atlantic cod has yielded
conclusions of a metapopulation structure, with sub-
populations of spawning groups spread or
previously spread throughout the three managed
areas, with current declines in localized areas
(Sinclair 1988, Ruzzante et al. 1998, Ames 2004).
The difference in the outcome should be a weighed
factor in the decision-making process.
This conflict between stock structure assumptions
and management has produced a wide body of
literature on the issues of scale, both in the
operational or geographical sense of the term
(Hartje 2002) and its political sense of hierarchical
management (Swyngedouw 2004, Silver 2008).
This issue is so ubiquitous in natural resources
management, and aquatic resources specifically,
due to the fact that resource boundaries rarely
coincide with institutional or government
boundaries (Folke et al. 1998). A popular argument
recently has been to decrease the scale of
governance, managing as close to the community
scale of the resource as possible (Subramanian et al.
1997), for its advantages in lowering transaction
costs of management and increasing familiarity with
the local resource. However, the presence of cross-
scale linkages, both politically and ecologically,
prevent any single-scale approach from being
completely sufficient (Berkes 2006, Cash et al.
2006). These factors complicate the NEFMC’s and
any other management body’s ability to
successfully incorporate social and ecological
feedback into the management structure. The
advantages, however, as noted by Cudney-Bueno
and Basurto (2009), of incorporating these
feedbacks provide for successful and sustainable
fisheries. Thus, although management scale is a
human construct, influenced by political boundaries
and processes and scientific conceptions (Swyngedouw
2004, Brown and Purcell 2005), the maintenance of
social and ecological resilience requires that such
scaled feedback be recognized and incorporated into
adaptive management regimes (Tompkins and
Adger 2004, Hughes et al. 2005).
Future research, including further defining
participation costs and interests and interviewing
Council members and participants, would help to
either explain these conclusions or redirect the
research. These efforts would be conducted in hopes
of further improving the effectiveness of the
regional council system in regulating the nation’s
fisheries.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art2/responses/
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